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Wireshark-bugs: [Wireshark-bugs] [Bug 11790] New: Wireshark stack-based buffer overflow in AirPD

Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2015 15:30:42 +0000
Bug ID 11790
Summary Wireshark stack-based buffer overflow in AirPDcapPacketProcess
Product Wireshark
Version Git
Hardware All
OS All
Status UNCONFIRMED
Severity Major
Priority Low
Component Dissection engine (libwireshark)
Assignee [email protected]
Reporter [email protected]

Created attachment 14045 [details]
Reproducers.

Build Information:
Wireshark git master.
--
The following crash due to a stack-based buffer overflow can be observed in an
ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to
tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):

Attached are three files which trigger the crash.

--- cut ---
==2992==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0x7ffe9b2a2fc0 at pc 0x0000004c1386 bp 0x7ffe9b2a0f70 sp 0x7ffe9b2a0720
WRITE of size 43264 at 0x7ffe9b2a2fc0 thread T0
    #0 0x4c1385 in __asan_memcpy
llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:393
    #1 0x4189c2b in AirPDcapPacketProcess wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:713:9
    #2 0x29525e9 in dissect_ieee80211_common
wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211.c:17767:9
    #3 0x2924581 in dissect_ieee80211
wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211.c:18375:10
    #4 0xaf3794 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #5 0xae5692 in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #6 0xaefb1b in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
    #7 0xae09f3 in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
    #8 0x28d825c in dissect_wlan_radio
wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211-radio.c:976:10
    #9 0xaf3794 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #10 0xae5692 in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #11 0xaefb1b in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
    #12 0xae09f3 in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
    #13 0x28e5df4 in dissect_radiotap
wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211-radiotap.c:1796:2
    #14 0xaf3794 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #15 0xae5692 in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #16 0xae4e1d in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1148:9
    #17 0x25dca12 in dissect_frame
wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:500:11
    #18 0xaf3794 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #19 0xae5692 in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #20 0xaefb1b in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
    #21 0xae09f3 in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
    #22 0xadffde in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:501:3
    #23 0xab6d0d in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:373:2
    #24 0x53c91b in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3728:5
    #25 0x535d90 in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3484:11
    #26 0x52c1df in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13

Address 0x7ffe9b2a2fc0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 8256 in frame
    #0 0x418907f in AirPDcapPacketProcess wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:630

  This frame has 5 object(s):
    [32, 44) 'id'
    [64, 8256) 'tmp_data'
    [8512, 8516) 'tmp_len' <== Memory access at offset 8256 partially
underflows this variable
    [8528, 8544) 'id.coerce' <== Memory access at offset 8256 partially
underflows this variable
    [8560, 8576) 'id.coerce83' <== Memory access at offset 8256 partially
underflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack
unwind mechanism or swapcontext
      (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow
llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:393 in __asan_memcpy
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x10005364c5a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10005364c5b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10005364c5c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10005364c5d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10005364c5e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x10005364c5f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
  0x10005364c600: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
  0x10005364c610: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 04 f2 00 00 f2 f2 00 00
  0x10005364c620: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10005364c630: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x10005364c640: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Heap right redzone:      fb
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack partial redzone:   f4
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==2992==ABORTING
--- cut ---

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse without
a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically become
visible to the public.


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